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20 parties have registered in the current election campaign. Many people say it is a too big number for such a small country as Moldova. At the same time, much more parties could take part in the election campaign.

Activists launch Moldova’s first ‘Space Camp’ © Susan Coughtrie

Moldova: Change anyone really can believe in?

Headlines

• "Moldova Azi" information portal is changing its format and editorial content, Centrul pentru Jurnalism Independent, 8 August 2011, 15:19
• Moldovan students queue up to apply for scholarships in Romania, Info-Prim Neo, 4 August 2011, 13:44
• Ukrainian scholarships not very popular in Moldova, Info-Prim Neo, 2 August 2011, 14:58
• Kent Larson: USAID will always support process of Moldova democratization, INFOTAG, 1 August 2011, 13:42
• Parliament sets up new commission - for checking civil servants' property and incomes, INFOTAG, 29 July 2011, 9:00
• Scandal in Moldovan parliament over deputies' relatives, INFOTAG, 29 July 2011, 9:00

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By Rodger Potocki, TOL (Czech Republic)
May 11, 2009     

The mantra of Barack Obama's U.S. presidential campaign seems to have touched even tiny Moldova, which held parliamentary elections on 5 April. The Communists claim that enough citizens revised their opinion of the party to endorse its governing without a coalition. The opposition asserts that voters rejected the Communist Party’s appeal for “stability” and the status quo. International monitors suggest that the government has mended its ways and pulled off a credible election. Civil society organizations in the country allege that the contest was worse than ever.

And young people, led by an activist in an “I Love Obama” T-shirt, took to the streets because they couldn’t tolerate yet another dirty election and four more years of Communist rule.

Was change in the air? Did President Vladimir Voronin and his Communist Party win an even bigger victory than Obama and the Democrats? Could half of all voters have opted for a party plagued by corruption, poor administration, and a floundering economy? Was this election better or worse than previous efforts? Did an irredentist Romania attempt a coup that led to the burning of the parliament and ransacking of the presidential building? Or was it another “color revolution” in the making?

Beyond all the conspiracy speak, rhetoric, recriminations, spin, and Twitter, what is striking is how little things have really changed in Moldova.

SHAKY NUMBERS

To many observers, it seems unlikely that the Communists won 49 percent of the vote and 60 seats this time around. While the party gained 49.9 percent of the vote in a free and fair election in 2001, its total fell to 45.98 percent in 2005. Though the difference in percentage seems small, it amounted to a loss of 15 seats and the loss of an absolute majority. In the 2007 local elections, the Communists did significantly worse than in 2003; opposition parties and independents won a majority of seats. The Communists seemed to peak in 2001 and have since suffered a decline in popularity.

Public opinion polling prior to the April election did not contradict this trend. A September 2008 Vox Populi poll had the Communists running at 20 percent. A month later, another poll indicated that 23.5 percent favored the ruling party. A November 2008 survey by the Public Opinion Polling Center Socioinform found that 22.9 percent of respondents would support the party in the next parliamentary ballot.

Why the apparent decline? Two weeks before the elections, the Chisinau-based Institute for Public Policy’s “Barometer of Public Opinion” found that nearly 59 percent of respondents thought the country was heading in the wrong direction, an increase of 8 percent from six months earlier. More than three-quarters were unhappy with the government’s major economic and social policies. And about a third believed that the country’s economic situation had worsened. The poll found that 36.2 percent would vote for the Communists.

With numbers like these, it is not surprising that citizens reacted strongly after hearing reports that the Communists had won close to 50 percent of the vote. That incredible figure was even higher than a hard-to-believe exit poll indicating a 44.7 percent showing. While every pre-election survey indicated that the Communist Party would win the most votes, none predicted that it would come within a hair of racking up an absolute majority. Was this reversal of fortune credible? Few among the expert community in Moldova think so. The consensus is that the government had relied more on old-fashioned dirty tricks than clever campaigning to make up the 10 to 15 percent it would need to win three-fifths of the seats, elect a president, and govern without a coalition.

NOTHING NEW

Elections in Moldova have a troubled history, especially since the Communist Party took over after the 2001 parliamentary elections. Local elections in 2003, the first national contests since the Communists returned to power, did not meet standards set in previous elections, according to international observers. “Allegations of widespread abuse of power by the authorities were a source of concern and marked a negative development,” according to an OSCE report. The OSCE’s observer mission referred to the arrest and intimidation of candidates and use of administrative resources for campaign purposes. In marked contrast to the 2001 elections, the ruling Communist Party organized and benefited from heavily biased state media. The report also cited problems with voter lists that warranted “careful examination before the next elections.”

Not much was different two years later. While the 2005 parliamentary elections were “mostly” free and fair and “generally complied” with most international standards for democratic elections, they “fell short” of some that are “central to a genuinely competitive election process.” Although Election Day went relatively smoothly, OSCE’s Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights cited state “coercion and pressure,” as well as “abuse of administrative resources” prior to voting. Campaign conditions and access to the media “were not satisfactorily equitable.” There were again problems with the accuracy of voter lists.

By the 2007 local election, a pattern was obvious. International observers noted that, while the process was generally well-administered, “the election fell short of a number of OSCE commitments central to a competitive electoral process.” Though the actual voting went well, there were “key problems” during the campaign period, including intimidation and pressure against candidates by the authorities; the failure of state media to provide balanced, fair, and impartial news coverage; and “a continuing lack of uniformity in the preparation and verification of voter lists.” International observes issued a series of recommendations, a number of which were not new but had not been acted on.

This time around, the OSCE observer reports indicated that it was business as usual in this regard for the ruling Communist Party. The first interim report on the April 5 election cited criminal investigations opened against opposition leaders while noting that the number of registered voters on lists had been increased by 160,000. Other figures have been cited, from 200,000 to as many as 400,000. The second interim report contained allegations of harassment of candidates, campaign staff, and voters, and abuse of administrative resources by the authorities. It expressed concerns about voter lists compiled through non-uniform practices and a discrepancy between local and national authorities as to the number of eligible voters.

BURIED CRITICISM, DEAD SOULS

The day after the polls closed, the OSCE/ODIHR issued preliminary findings that the election met “many of the OSCE and Council of Europe commitments.” Again, the focus was on Election Day. The government, foreign press, and even a few well-regarded international experts were quick to cite the OSCE/ODIHR’s apparent blessing of the election as “generally free and fair,” even though there was dissent within the mission itself.

Few, however, seem to have studied the entire report, which includes statements of shortcomings similar to those identified in every election over the last nine years. The written report was more nuanced, balanced, and critical than the speeches and statements made at the press conference. The problem again centered on the campaign period, which witnessed “credible” and “verified” cases of intimidation against voters and candidates, misuse of administrative resources, state media bias, and problems with voter lists. Four years ago, the election generally complied with “most” international commitments and standards. The use of the word “many” this time around indicates a more critical judgment of this election.

The opposition has focused on the questionable voter lists as the primary explanation for the difference between the Communists’ polling numbers and its alleged vote total. Specifically, the government increased the voter lists by some 10 to 12 percent from the 2005 figure, despite the fact that, according to official statistics, Moldova’s population has declined by at least one-fifth since the 2005 elections; up to one-quarter of the population, including an estimated 20 percent of eligible voters, lives and works outside the country.

The OSCE/ODIHR needs assessment prior to the April election spoke of “long-standing problems with the accuracy and completeness of voters’ lists.” It stated that the Central Election Commission was developing a centralized electronic voter register to ensure maximum accuracy and allow for online tracking of the electoral process to prevent multiple voting. The register, however, was not completed in time for the election.

A MOLDOVAN TRADITION

Civil society in Moldova corroborated many of the findings of the international observers. The Civic Coalition for Free and Fair Elections – Coalition 2009, comprised of more than 70 Moldovan organizations, conducted scores of citizen education, voter mobilization, and election monitoring programs for the April election. The coalition judged the elections to be “incorrect” and only “partially free” due to numerous violations of the electoral code, including the misuse of administrative resources, pressure and undue influence by the state on electoral contestants, and biased media. The Electronic Press Association, which conducted the Coalition’s independent media monitoring, found that the state broadcast media treated “unfairly, tendentiously, and in an unbalanced way, the political actors involved in the election process.”

While it uncovered evidence of problems on Election Day, the coalition also targeted criticism at the campaign period. At a briefing before Election Day, a coalition representative spoke of a pattern of government abuse, what he called a “Moldovan tradition.”

While improvements have been made in Moldova’s “election results system,” little has been done to fix the endemic shortcomings prior to ballots being cast.

In fact, some elements have become worse. OSCE’s elections needs assessment indicated that the situation regarding the media “has been assessed by a number of domestic and international actors to have deteriorated over the course of the last four years.” The post-election preliminary report and press conference were particularly critical of the state media.

DIFFERENT SCRIPT

This lack of change in the Communist Party’s approach to elections is hardly news: two weeks before the April contests, a plurality of respondents to a public opinion survey, 43 percent, did not believe that elections in Moldova are free or fair. The government and the Communist Party did all they could to distract attention from their heavy-handed actions in the campaign period.

Despite the critical international and domestic election reports, Voronin called the contest “one of the most organized and democratic elections” ever in Moldova. Keeping the focus on Election Day, he initiated a recount in response to claims of fraud, knowing that the real problems took place before the ballots were cast or counted. Yet he ruled out a review of the voter lists; the Constitutional Court, ruling in favor of a request by the Communist Party, blocked public access to the voter lists, making verification of earlier fraud much more difficult. Three members of the Central Election Commission refused to certify the election.

Following a game plan used by other autocrats who manipulate elections, Voronin blamed the resulting protests on external and internal “enemies.” He sought to divert domestic attention from a flawed process and justify a brutal crackdown by accusing Romania of orchestrating a coup. Due to a complicated history, Communists in Moldova have often exploited fears of Romanian irredentism for political gain. Through a series of confrontational moves, Chisinau has effectively severed relations with Bucharest. While few observers buy into claims of Romanian conspiracies, the resulting fracas has diverted European Union attention from the flawed election and toward facilitating a diplomatic solution. Nevertheless, a visiting European Parliament delegation found major deficiencies in the carrying out of the election.

As it intimidated candidates, the government is bullying civil society organizations involved in the crisis of confidence. It seeks to discredit groups providing information not conforming to the official version of events. Journalists from independent media reporting on election fraud and post-election protests were beaten and detained. The editor of the newspaper Ziarul de Garda, which published examples of “dead men voting,” was arrested, as were up to a dozen other journalists, editors, and cameramen.

Seven civil society groups, including members of Coalition 2009, were accused by the Justice Ministry of being “co-organizers” of the protests. These seven groups, as well as four others, including organizations exposing the human rights abuses perpetrated by the government during its crackdown on protesters, have been ordered to appear before tax inspectorates and identify their sources of funding. This is not the first time such pressure has been applied. Four years earlier, the secretary of the Communist Party attacked Coalition 2005 for its efforts on behalf of free and fair elections.

LESS ACCEPTING

Whether it was manipulating voter lists, multiple voting, biased media, or other machinations, young people in Chisinau seemed more skeptical of official results and better informed than international observers. Reacting to the exit poll and reports of an unusually large vote for the Communists, youth were in the city’s main square protesting before the international observers had packed their bags.

The initial gathering was a flash mob organized by a small group of young people to mourn the death of democracy from a fixed election. They were joined by thousands of other like-minded young people. As one blogger put it, “They protest because they know that the Communists did not get every single second vote in these elections.” Another blogger wrote that “the elections were stolen, in a sense, even before observers came to the country. Using mass media under its control and administrative resources, the ruling Communist Party has intimidated, bought, forced, and convinced people to vote for them. … During the elections there are many accusations that dead people were on the lists.”

I FIGHT, I RESIST, I’M AN ANTI-COMMUNIST

It’s hardly surprising that young Moldovans were in the streets of Chisinau following the elections. On the contest’s eve, a poll indicated that two-thirds of those ages 18 to 29 thought the country was moving in the wrong direction, more young people were unhappy with the state of the economy than any other segment of society, and 82 percent were dismayed about political life in the country. In Moldovan society, youth trusts the president the least, followed by the government, the Communist Party, and the state-run media. Perhaps most importantly, they believe more that their actions can make a difference.

Identifying with a core group calling themselves the “Anti-Communist Movement,” the young Moldovans protesting were motivated by ideals, not a neighboring country or a rich oligarch. In Chisinau’s main square, the anti-authoritarian slogans and banners far outnumbered the Romanian flags. It was a freedom protest, not a nationalist rally. The only role played by Romania was as a symbol and beacon of a different life in the European Union. According to a March 2009 poll, most young Moldovans believe that their future lies outside of their country’s borders.

The government knows all of this very well. And young people paid the price for it in lives lost and bodies beaten. During the days following the protests, more than 300 young people were arrested. Some are still missing. The UN, Amnesty International, OSCE, and other international bodies have confirmed and condemned reports of imprisoned youth being tortured and sexually abused by their captors. There are stories of youth being billed for their detention and funds to cover the damages from the protests being taken from the budget of universities.

The only real change surrounding this election is likely to be the increasing radicalization of youth and loss of credibility of the Communists. Natalia Morar, an organizer of the flash mob, explained that the unexpectedly large turnout was due to “the explosive anger among young people at the government’s policies and electoral fraud.” The government’s predictable behavior before, during, and after the election was the last straw for many young people, who just can’t imagine four more years of Communist rule.

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Rodger Potocki, director for Europe and Eurasia at the U.S. National Endowment for Democracy, was in Moldova during the elections and protests. NED is one of the donors supporting the nonpartisan election programs of Coalition 2009 and provides some grant funds to TOL.